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Abstract
We study the dynamics of a generalized Minority Game (GMG) and of the
Bar Attendance Model (BAM) in which a number of agents self-organize to
match an attendance that is fixed externally as a control parameter. We com-
pare the usual dynamics used for the Minority Game with one for the BAM
that makes a better use of the available information. We study the asymptotic
states reached in both frameworks. We show that states that can be assim-
ilated to either thermodynamic equilibrium or quenched configurations can
appear in both models, but with different settings. We discuss the relevance
of the parameter G that measures the value of the prize for winning in units
of the fine for losing. We also provide an annealing protocol by which the
quenched configurations of the GMG can progressively be modified to reach
an asymptotic equlibrium state that coincides with the one obtained with the
BAM.
PACS Numbers: 02.50.Le,05.40.-a, 64.60.Ak, 89.90.+n
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent times considerable attention has been given to the description of self-
organization processes in multiagent models. These are geared to explain how (and which)
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individual decisions give rise to cooperative effects that show up in the behavior of the sys-
tem as a whole. Such models have a wide number of interesting applications in a variety
of situations that range from routing of messages in an information network to the way in
which equilibrium is (dynamically) achieved by an ensemble of economic agents.
The main question posed in this line of analysis is how a system composed of multiple
agents acting in a decentralized fashion is able to reach a state of “macroscopic order” in
which individual decisions appear to be coordinated with one another. A well know example
of this line of research is the Bar Attendance Model (BAM) proposed by B. Arthur in Ref [1].
This model has been developed to illustrate a case of coordination through a process that
can be assimilated to inductive learning.
In the BAM a (large) number of individuals have to decide whether or not to go to a
bar at a certain date. They share the common perception that attendance is not desirable
when the number of people who are present exceeds a critical value, which is smaller than
the total population of clients. Otherwise they derive utility from going to the bar.
A dynamics is proposed by which each agent individually updates her criteria to decide
the attendance. These are based upon public information, that concerns the total attendance
in the previous days. Agents use inductive reasoning to predict the number of customers in
the following day.
It is simple to realize that the model is self-deceiving: if everybody decides to attend,
crowding is produced and everybody loses. Everybody will then refrain to go the next day
situation in which, again, everybody loses because many could go without crowding. In an
iterated version of the model agents plan their attendance for the next few days. In this case
it is more evident that the only stable solution is a situation in which a diversity of individual
strategies compensate with each other saturating the capacity of the bar every day. The
system self-organizes in a (dynamic) Nash equilibrium in which every agent optimizes their
respective situation given what has been done by the rest of the players. In this case any
player that changes unilaterally her rules ends up loosing. Such equilibrium is also Pareto
optimal because no agent can improve her situation without harming that of some other
player. If adaptation is stocastic, the attendance equilibrates at the accepted value with
random fluctuations.
An alternative version of the BAM called the Minority Game (MG) has recently received
much attention [2], [3], [4], [5]. The main feature of this framework is that agents derive
utility whenever their choice coincides with that of the minority. Self deceiving is also evident
within this framework. The MG has been presented as a simplified version of the BAM. In
the present paper we concentrate in the approach of the MG introduced in ref. [5] and make
a detailed comparison of the MG and the BAM. We will see that the MG, besides being a
particular case of the BAM (namely one in which the optimal attendance has been fixed at
half of the total number of customers) it makes a different use of the same information [6].
The treatments of the BAM have traditionally [1], [7] been based upon genetic algorithms
[11]. Each agent is assumed to keep a set of strings that encode her possible attendance
schedules for the following days. After that period each agent computes the outcome of all
her possible plans and chooses the best to use it during the next period. The attendance
schedules are considered as the “genomes” of a genetic algorithm and are updated by selec-
tion, random mutations and crossover. The BAM can be regarded as an iterated version of
the MG, i.e. one in which players have to make their choices for several rounds of the same
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game. There is however one important difference. The BAM only involves (the iteration
of) pure strategies where players either go or not go to the bar. The players in the MG
have instead mixed strategies, i.e. they make their choice of going or not going with a given
probability. The iterated pure strategies in the BAM undergo an adaptive process. Within
the MG mixed strategies also change. Each agent randomly attends the bar (with a given
probability) and collects points or pays fines depending that the attendance is below or above
the acceptable level. The mixed strategy (i.e.her attendance probability) is changed when
her account falls below a given threshold. Both the BAM and the probabilistic approach
of ref. [5] can be regarded as mean field descriptions because only the aggregate effect of
the whole ensemble of agents is relevant for both adaptive processes. On the other hand,
the mixed strategy played by the agents in the MG can be assimilated to a time averaged
version of the iterated attendace schedules of the players in the BAM.
In order to render possible a comparison between the MG and the BAM two elements
have to be considered. On the one hand a generalized version of the MG (the GMG) has
to be developed to describe situations traditionally considered within the BAM, namely
cases in which the winning choice is to meet the one taken by an arbitrary fraction of the
population, not just the minority. There are no systematic studies of this GMG. On the
other hand a probabilistic (mixed strategy) mean field approach of the BAM has to be
developed. There are a number of possibilities to define the mixed strategies for these two
models. In the present paper we consider for the GMG an obvious extension of the adaptive
updating dynamics that reproduces the well known selforganizing features of the MG. For
the BAM we propose instead a mixed strategy that reproduces the results obtained with
the usual treatments of this model that use iterated, pure strategies. It turns out that both
dynamics are different. It happens that the one associated to the BAM makes a better use of
the available information than in the GMG. Although in both frameworks - GMG and BAM
- all agents have access to the same information, with the proposed BAM rules they are able
to keep better track of the causes for winning or loosing thus making a more effective use of
it than in the GMG. These seamingly minor changes produce widely different cooperative
behaviors. The GMG leads in general to quenched states that are far from equilibrium.
The BAM evolution leads instead to an asymptotic configuration that can be thought of as
a thermodynamic equilibrium: it has lost memory of the initial conditions, the individual
strategies continue to be updated at all times and yet the density distribution of attendance
strategies remains stationary. In the following sections we discuss how both models yield
similar results in a rather reduced portion of the space of parameters but turn out to be
largely different in all the rest. We show that an essential parameter that governs the self-
organized configuration of the system is determined by the rewards and punishments that
are contained in the scoring of successes and failures of the agents. The control parameter
is the value G of the prize for winning relative to the fine for losing. Ordinarily the effect
of this parameter has been disregarded and the only case studied in the literature is G = 1.
Quenching and equilibrium regions change significantly for G 6= 1.
In the next Section we describe and characterize the quenched state in the GMG and
discuss the phase diagram that is found if G is left as a free parameter. In Section 3 we
compare this to the BAM. In Sect. 4 we provide an analytic discussion to support the results
presented in the previous sections. In Sect. 5 we present an annealing protocol that makes
use of the fact that quenching is a consequence of the memory stored in the system encoded
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by the points gained by the agents. The protocol allows to reach equilibrium using the MG
dynamics by modifying progressively the quenched state removing the memory stored in the
system.
II. THE GMG MODEL
We consider an N -agent system in which each has an mixed attendance strategy ex-
pressed by a probability pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) to go to the bar. We take n to be the acceptable
level of attendance without crowding. The prescription to adapt the individual strategies is
the following. If the attendance A turns out to be A ≤ n, and the agent chooses to go to
the bar, she gains G points. Otherwise, pays a fine of one point. The value G is left as a
free parameter .
The balance of gains and losses keeps a record of successes and failures of each agent. If
the latter are more frequent than the former, her account ends up by falling below some fixed
threshold (that we take to be 0). In this case her account is reset to zero and her strategy
pi is updated. This is done by changing the value of pi by one chosen at random within the
interval (pi − δp, pi + δp). The witdth of this interval (we take δp = .05) is left unchanged
during the whole process. Reflective boundary conditions for pi are used whenever necessary.
All N agents have initially 0 points and their initial attendance strategies are chosen with
some criterion. In the present section we restrict ourselves to consider the case in which all
p’s are initially chosen at random from the interval [0, 1] with uniform probability.
The state of the many agent system is well described by the density distribution P (p)
that gives the fraction of agents that have a strategy within the interval (p, p + dp). In
order to calculate this we generate an ensemble of H histories of the N -agent system by
evolving it during a fixed number of iterations and starting from statistically equivalent
initial conditions. The density P (p) is obtained by normalizing the frequency of occurrence
of a given strategy in the whole set of the H histories. The number of iterations is fixed by
checking that a stationary configuration has been reached.
We also compute other parameters that describe the state of the system. One is the
attendance A(t) averaged over the H histories as a function of the iteration number t; in the
following we quote M(t) ≡ A(t)/N , to facilitate the comparison for different values of N .
A second important parameter is the fraction of agents Cs(t) that change their individual
strategies as a function of the iteration number. This fraction provides a direct measure of
the stability of the state that has been reached. We will use P∞ to refer to the asymptotic
distribution, t→∞, whenever the system reaches an stationary state.
A well known result obtained within the framework of the pure MG is a strong polar-
ization of the population. A distribution PMG∞ (p) is reached in which essentially half of the
agents always go to the bar while the other half never go . As a consequence M(t) → 1/2
except for random fluctuations due to the updating of individual strategies that take place
at all times [5], [9].
The evolution of a system with the GMG rules and n 6= N/2 has been studied by Johnson
[8] and by us [6]. If the reduced acceptable level of attendance µ ≡ n/N is close enough
to 1/2 an equilibrium situation is reached that resembles the MG results (see Fig.1a)).
Equilibrium is shown by the fact that M → µ and Cs(t) stabilizes at a constant, non zero
value after a transient. In Fig. 1b) we show typical plots ofM(t) and Cs(t) for this situation.
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On the contrary, if µ is larger than a critical value µcr (see below) a situation is reached in
which no further updating of the strategies takes place (’quenched’ configuration). In Fig. 2
we show an example of the distribution Pq(p) that is obtained by setting µ > µcr > 1/2.
The distribution Pq(p) that is obtained strongly differs from P
GMG
∞ (p). The fact that
Cs(t) tends exponentially to 0 (see Fig.2b)) indicates that a situation has been found that
is completely different than the one commented before. This happens because the largest
fraction of the population has gained many points and even though their accounts may fluc-
tuate, they are not expected to fall below the threshold required to update their individual
strategies. The consequence of this is that M stabilizes at a value that may be far from µ.
While the situation for µ ∼ 1/2 can be thought as some kind of thermodynamic equilib-
rium, this case should instead be associated to a quenched configuration in which the state
variables are rapidly fixed at values that are close to the initial conditions.
We have performed extensive numerical simulations to investigate this situation using
values of µ above and below 1/2 and several values of G. As expected an overall symmetry
is found around µ = 1/2. This is because matching an attendance level greater than 1/2 is
equivalent as matching a symmetric absence level equally greater than 1/2. As will shortly
become evident symmetry is not strict. We discuss this point in Section 5.
Several features that are displayed in the quenched distribution shown in Fig. 2 are worth
to be remarked. In the first place it is found that Pq(p) = 0 for 0 < p < 1/2 and µ≫ 1/2.
This can easily be understood. When µ ≫ 1/2 the agents that have p < 1/2 lose more
frequently that they win and therefore update their attendance strategies more frequently
increasing the value of p whenever possible. Once their individual strategies are greater that
1/2 the inverse happens, agents seldom lose points and therefore are not forced to update
their individual strategies. This also justifies that the width of the hump near p = 1/2 turns
out to be only a function of δp.
The above arguments indicate that the shape of Pq(p) strongly depends upon the initial
conditions. This is the reason why we prefer to call this effect “quenching” rather that
“freezing”. The latter suggests a new ordering that bears no relationship with the initial
conditions, while the former indicates that a dynamics has been imposed that suddenly
reaches a fixed point leaving the internal parameters of the system at values that are close
to the ones chosen with the initial conditions and that may be far from equilibrium.
In Fig. 3 we illustrate some cases in which quenching takes place. We plot the asymptotic
value of the reduced attendance M reached by the system as a function of µ, displaying only
the sector with µ > 1/2, for several values of G.
In Fig.(3b) we also show a plot of the dispersion σM of the values of M obtained in all
the H histories of the ensemble (σ2M =
∑H
h (A∞(h)− < A∞ >H)2)/NH). This parameter
plays the roˆle of a susceptibility. It displays a peak located at the transition region and is
essentially constant outside it. The finite width of the peak as well as the irregularities of
M in the transition region are to be attributed to the finiteness of the system.
It is possible to associate a critical value µcr with the change between both regimes. In
the numerical experiments, the large fluctuations ofM near µcr are due to the fact that some
of the histories that make up the ensemble happen to quench while others, purely due to
random fluctuations, reach instead equilibrium. As µ increases, the proportion between both
types of histories gradually changes leading to the situation in which all possible evolutions
lead to quenched states. The peaked behavior of σM at µ = µcr supports the picture that a
5
sort of critical phenomenon actually takes place in the system for a precise value of µ.
There are several criteria to define µcr. We have chosen to define it by the minimum value
of µ for which the dynamics leads the system to a situation in which the whole population
has accumulated a fixed gain, that we (arbitrarily) chose to be not less than 20 points. In
Fig.(3b) we show ϕ20, the fraction of the population that has accumulated at least 20 points
as a function of µ. It is clear that if this happens any further changes in the distribution
P (p) or in the attendance are extremly unlikely to occur. Another possibility is to choose
the value of µ that corresponds to the intersection of the lines that are associated to both
regimes or the maximum of σM . Again the difference between these deffinitions are to be
attributed to the finitness of the systems that we have studied.
The value of µcr depends both upon G and N . Changes in G have not been explored
previously and cause important changes in the region in which quenching occurs as well
as in the shape of the distribution PGMG∞ (p). The effects of the value of G in µcr can be
seen in Fig. 3a). The general phase diagram (see Fig.4) shows two regions that correspond
to quenched and unquenched systems. The border between both regions is given by the
function µcr(G). Finite size effects are also displayed in this figure through the values of
µcr(G) for two values of N . The results displayed in Fig. 4 allows to conjecture that for an
infinite system with G = 1 and µ = 1/2 the usual settings of the Minority Game lead to an
unstable quenched phase.
The changes in the distribution PGMG∞ (p) that are due to changes in µ keeping G fixed
are shown in figs 1 and 2 and 5a). An increase in µ produces an increasingly asymmetric
distribution. This hold up to the point in which µ > µcrit and quenching occurs giving rise to
a humped distribution PGMGq (p). The changes introduced by different values of G are shown
in Fig. 5b). The overall effect of this parameter is to increase the polarization, preserving
the level of asymmetry fixed by µ. Values of G < 1 are reflected in distributions that are
barely peaked at the corners. The polarization increases for G = 1 and values of G that
are only slightly larger than 1 produce distributions PGMG∞ (p) that vanish for all values of p
except in the close neighborhood of p = 0 and p = 1. Values of G that are even larger places
the system into the quenching region of the phase diagram because every successful initial
move produces such a large gain that a revision of the strategy becomes extremely unlikely;
therefore the evolution of the system produces only mild changes in the initial distribution.
III. THE BAM MODEL
The dynamics of the GMG does not keep track of the situations that lead to succeses or
failures. This is instead stressed in the BAM. It has been customary to accept that agents
derive utility in two situations: one when they decide to go to the bar and M ≤ µ and also
when they refrain to go to the bar and M > µ.
We propose for the BAM an adaptive dynamics that is based upon the same information
as in the GMG but uses it differently in order to keep track of the situations that lead to
gains or losses i.e. by correlating them with the action of going or not going to the bar.
To this end we introduce “points” and “credits”. Points are gained or lost if the option of
attending the bar is correct or not. Credits are instead gained or lost depending whether
the option of not attending the bar is correct or not. We therefore carry a double account.
If an agent chooses to attend (not to attend) the bar and M < µ (M > µ) gains a point (a
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credit). Otherwise, she loses a point (a credit). When either the number of points or the
number of credits falls below some threshold, the corresponding account of points or credits
is reset to zero and the strategy is changed in the same fashion as already mentioned for the
GMG.
Note that the attendance strategy of an agent is changed by either of two reasons. Such
updating rule makes use of information that is lost with the scoring rules used for the GMG.
Suppose for instance that an agent having initially all her accounts in zero chooses to go to
the bar one day in which M < µ and chooses not to go the next day when the attendance
turns out to be again M < µ. Within the GMG rules she ends up with zero points and her
strategy is not updated. With the double account of the BAM she ends up instead with one
positive point and one negative credit and is therefore forced to update her strategy [10].
We have performed numerical simulations using this dynamics with similar settings than
those reported in the preceeding section. The results for the BAM are compared with those
obtained with the GMG dynamics in Figs. 1,2. When quenching is absent in the GMG, the
asymptotic distributions PBAM∞ (p) can barely be distinguished from P
GMG
∞ (p). For this case
the values of the attendance A(t) and Cs(t) for the BAM are shown in Fig. 1b). A strong
difference however occurs when µ > µcr and the GMG gets trapped in a quenched configu-
ration. For the same settings the BAM converges instead to equilibrium. The asymptotic
distribution PBAM∞ shows a strong polarization and the attendance reaches the accepted
level without difficulty. The nature of the asymptotic state has no difference with that for
µ < µcr. This can be seen in Fig. 2b).
A more profound diference between the two model arises when the above analysis is
repeated for G 6= 1. While the GMG dynamics can be checked to lead to quenched con-
figurations for essentially all values of G, as shown in Fig.4, the BAM model displays no
quenching independently of the value of G. Quenching can however occur in the BAM but
for different initial conditions than a uniform distribution. We turn to this point in the next
section.
IV. ANALYTIC DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss analytically the relevant features of the density distribution
P (p) as well as the occurrence of quenching within both the GMG and the BAM.
A. The density distribution
The shape of the distribution P (p) is the combined result of the actions of the whole
ensemble of agents. Each player adjusts her attendance attempting to minimize her indi-
vidual loss. When equilibrium is reached the resulting P∞(p) for both GMG and BAM,
concentrates the population in the immediate neighborhood of p ≃ 0 and p ≃ 1, plus an
almost vanishing contribution from intermediate values. The ratio of the areas below the
two peaks is, essentially, equal to µ/(1 − µ). An intuitive guess for P (p) could well be
instead a sharply peaked function centered at p ≃ µ. The difference has to be sought in the
properties of the distribution P(A) that gives the probability of occurrence of a party of A
customers attending the bar. The distribution P(A) is of course completely determined by
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P (p). If P (p) ≃ δ(p− µ) the corresponding P(A) turns out to be large for values of A that
differ from the optimal one, the highly polarized equilibrium distribution that is actually
generated produces instead a P(A) that is much more concentrated near A = Nµ.
Let us assume without loss of generality that all the agents distribute themselves into D
different strategies pi; i = 1 . . .D according to:
P (p) =
D∑
i
ni
N
δ(p− pi). (1)
where
∑D
i ni = N . With this assumption, the distribution P(A) can be written as:
P(A) =
n1∑
ℓ1=0
. . .
nD∑
ℓD=0
D∏
i
[
(
ni
ℓi
)
pℓii (1− pi)ni−ℓi]× δ(A−
D∑
j
ℓj). (2)
The value (A−Nµ)2 measures the departure from the optimal attendance, and therefore
C2 = ∑AP(A)(A − Nµ)2 can be taken to measure the square of the average cost incurred
by the ensemble of agents while adjusting their individual strategies [12].
Although Eq.2 is in general difficult to evaluate, C2 can be calculated without great
difficulties. In fact if its definition is introduced into Eq.2, the summation over A can be
performed first, taking advantage of the δ(A −∑Dj ℓj) and all the summations over the ℓj
indices decouple from each other. It results
C2 =
n1∑
ℓ1=0
. . .
nD∑
ℓD=0
D∏
i
[
(
ni
ℓi
)
pℓii (1− pi)ni−ℓi]× (Nµ −
D∑
j
ℓj)
2. (3)
Moreover, from Eq.(1), < p >=
∑
i nipi/N and < p
2 >=
∑
i nip
2
i /N , thus in the limit
D →∞ one gets
C2 = N2(µ− < p >)2 +N(< p > − < p2 >) (4)
In Eq.4 < p > stands for
∫
pP (p)dp. If P (p) = 1/N as for the case of the initial
conditions chosen in all the simulations in the preceeding sections, the dispersion turns out
to be C2 = N2(µ − 1/2)2 + N/6. We thus see that such initial condition is a good guess
for the traditional settings of the MG when µ ≃ 1/2, but is indeed very poor for the GMG
when µ 6= 1/2.
The equilibrium result < p >= µ that is always found, is seen to eliminate the O(N2)
terms in C2. This is also achieved with the guess P (p) = δ(p−µ). However, all O(N) terms
do not cancel because C2 = Nµ(1−µ). If the two peaked equilibrium distribution is roughly
approximated by P (p) = n1
N
δ(p − p1) + n2N δ(p − p2) one readily sees that the O(N2) terms
are eliminated when n1p1 + n2p2 = µN . The O(N) terms also cancel if the two peaks are
p1 = 0;n1 = N(1− µ) and p2 = 1;n2 = Nµ.
From this point of view, quenched states are far from optimizing the average aggregate
cost C2 because the corresponding Pq(p) do not even cancel the O(N2) terms. The relaxation
dynamics that tends to minimize individual losses is thus seen to also optimize a global
parameter (C2) only if equilibrium is reached. Otherwise the relaxation stops when no agent
loses. This situation, in general, does not corresponds to a minimal average cost.
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B. BAM
In this section we discuss the occurrence of equilibrium and quenching within the BAM.
This can only be made without any approximation if one assumes a distribution P (p) =
δ(p − po). This is seen to be appropriate except for O(N) terms in the dispersion of party
sizes.
Given an acceptable level of attendance n, if all agents have the same attendance strategy
po, the probability of occurrence of a party of less than n agents is S(N, n, po) where
S(N, n, po) =
n−1∑
i=0
(
N − 1
i
)
pio(1− po)N−1−i. (5)
This is a continuous and monotonous decreasing function of po and fulfills the following three
conditions:
S(N, n, 0) = 1 ∀n (6)
S(N, n, 1) = 0 ∀n (7)
S(N, n+m, po) ≥ S(N, n, po) ∀po, m > 0 (8)
If an agent decides to go to the bar, her account in points will remain equilibrated when
the expected rewards equals the expected fine, i.e. when the attendance strategy pp that is
common to all the agents fulfills:
S(N, n, pp) =
1
1 + G
(9)
If an agent decides instead not to go to the bar a similar condition can also be written for
her account in credits. This is:
S(N, n+ 1, pc) =
G
1 +G
(10)
Given G,N and n, the two equations (9) and (10) define the two roots pp and pc that are
respectively the probabilities with which all agents have to go if they hope to equilibrate,
respectively their accounts of points and credits.
Assume now that G = 1. Bearing in mind Eq.( 8) the two roots fulfill pp < pc. If the
agents choose to attend the bar with a probability po < pp, they gain points. On the other
hand, if they choose to attend with probability po > pc they gain credits. However, due to
the fact that pp < pc if they gain points they lose credits and viceversa. In either case all
agents will continue to update their strategies, quenching is not possible and equilibrium is
eventually reached.
For a δ-type distribution of strategies the only chance to have a quenched phase using
the BAM dynamics is to find a situation in which pc ≤ pp. For finite N this can only happen
if G > 1 (see Fig. 6). From the above two equations it is easy to see that the root pc
becomes smaller for increasing values of G and the opposite happens for pp. A value G
BAM
crit
can eventually be found in which both roots fulfill pp = pc ≡ pcrit. For any G > GBAMcrit the
regions for winning points and credits start to overlap and quenching occurs within a narrow
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overlapping interval (pc, pp). In Fig. 7 we show the two roots pp and pc as a function of G.
It further turns out that for finite values of N the value of GBAMcrit is nearly independent of µ.
The evolution of a δ-type distribution centered at a value of po depends upon the choice
of G and µ. If G > GBAMcrit , and po is inside the quenching interval (pc, pp) the distribution
will not change and the attendance M will remain fixed at the value chosen for the initial
conditions. This is so because because all agents win both points and credits. If po lies
outside of the quenching region, agents are forced to update their strategies either because
they lose point or because they lose credits. The average attendance M will approach
the value µ. Note that the average attendance and the average of individual strategies
are completely equivalent i.e. M =
∫
pP (p)dp . Therefore when the average attendance
approaches the quenching interval (pc, pp) , the evolution will progressively come to a stop.
For values of G up to G ∼ 5Gcrit the quenching interval (pc, pp) is always small (| pp− pc |∼
.1) and the convergence to a quenched phase is in general very slow. As the mean of
the distribution approaches the quenching interval, a smaller fraction of agents have to
update their strategies and therefore the fraction Cs(t) tends slowly to zero approaching very
nearly a power law, for a considerable number (∼ 106) of iterations. Since GBAMcrit is almost
independent of µ this behaviour does not change with its particular value. In the cases
in which po /∈ (pc, pp) the corresponding (asymmetric) distributions PBAMq (p) associated
to quenched configurations look similar to those associated to equilibrium because involve
agents with all possible attendance strategies.
C. GMG
A similar analysis as the one performed for the BAM can be made for the GMG. If the
system is prepared with a distribution P0(p) = δ(p−po) the single account of points remains
equilibrated provided that the probability of winning Pw(N, n, p) fulfills:
Pw(N, n, po) = poS(N, n, po) + (1− po)(1− S(N, n+ 1, po)) = 1
1 +G
(11)
In Fig. 6 we show an example of the functions S(N, n, p), S(N, n+1, p) and Pw(N, n, p)
for typical values of N and n, and n > N/2.
The situation for the GMG is completely different than for the BAM. The function
Pw(N, n, p) has one maximum in the interval 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, and to a high degree of accuracy
displays the symmetry Pw(N, n, p) = Pw(N,N − n, 1− p). Symmetry however is not strict.
To see this note that if n = N , going to the bar is always a winning option no matter the
option of the rest of the agents. If n = 0, the action of not going is not enough to win,
because that depends upon the choice made by all the other agents.
A critical value GGMGcr and a critical probability of attendance p
GMG
crit can be defined for
the GMG as the p value that corresponds to the maximum of Pw(N, n, p) given by Eq.( 11)
through
Pw(p
GMG
crit ) = P
max
w = maxpPw(N, n, p) (12)
GGMGcr =
1
Pmaxw
− 1 (13)
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For a given value of n and N quenching is produced if p = pcr and G ≥ Gcr. the values of
Gcr for the GMG are completely different from those of the BAM. While in the latter there
exists a common value of Gcr independent of µ this is not the case for the GMG (see Fig. 4).
Above Gcr and initial condition P0(p) = δ(p−p1), the quenching condition is fulfilled for
any p1 in the interval p< < p < p> that are the two roots of Eq.( 11). Any system prepared
with p1 within that region will rapidly be quenched. Assume for the sake of concretness that
we choose µ > 0.5. The system evolves quite differently if po < p< or po > p>. In the first
case the whole population of agents is forced to update their strategies in order to change the
individual p’s in order to surpass the value p<. Once this happens, updating progressively
comes to a stops as the average attendance gets into the interval (p<, p>) and the system
gets quenched with a value of M below the accepted fraction µ. The fact that Pw(N, n, p)
is such that p> is very nearly similar to µ causes that for p1 > p> the initial condition of a
δ−type distribution changes into PGMG∞ (p) with a mean value that is very close to µ that can
not be distinguished from an equilibrium distribution. In addition, updating of strategies
continues to take place continuously. Examples are shown in Fig. 8.
D. Finite-size effects
An estimate of the finite size effects of the models on the values of Gcr and pcr can
easily be made for the usual settings of the MG, by assuming a δ−type distribution as
an initial condition. For µ = 1/2, and from Eqs.(11) and (13) it follows immediately
that pcrit = 1/2 ∀N and the value of GGMGcrit can directly be estimated from the value of
PGMGw (p = 1/2) using Eq. (11) and standard asymptotic expansions. It turns out:i
GGMGcr =
√
[2πN ] + 2√
[2πN ]− 2 (14)
If this result remains valid for a uniform initial distribution, the usual settings for the
MG (G = 1 and µ = 1/2) correspond to a critically quenched system.
In Fig 9a) are shown GGMGcrit (µ = 1/2) and G
BAM
crit (µ = 1/2) as a function of 1/N . It is
seen that GGMGcrit ≃ GBAMcrit as N → ∞.The corresponding values for µ 6= 1/2 can be related
to those shown in Fig. 9a). In the first place one should notice that the value of GBAMcrit
is independent of µ. On the other hand, the curves of GGMGcrit (µ 6= 1/2) can be reduced
to the one shown through GGMGcrit (µ) = (aµ + b)G
GMG
crit (µ = 1/2) to a very good degree of
approximation (a and b ∼ constants, up to terms O(1/N)).
In what refers to the values of pcrit one can check (Fig. 9b)) that p
BAM
crit and p
GMG
crit
approach each other and tend to the common limiting value p∞crit = µ, as expected from a
na¨ıve estimate of the probability of attendance. One can also conjecture that GBAMcrit (∞) = 1.
V. ANNEALING
The situations described hitherto indicate that outside a very restricted region of µ and
for different initial conditions, the dynamics of the GMG rapidly approaches quenching. The
many agent system stops evolving, the attendance remains fixed at a value that is far from
the tolerated fraction µ and all the other internal parameters remain close to the initial
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conditions. Opposed to this, the BAM approaches always a distribution PBAM∞ (p) that
corresponds to what one expects of thermodynamics equilibrium: the attendance fluctuates
around the expected fraction µ, agents continue to update their individual strategies and
PBAM∞ (p) remains stationary.
There is a way to regain equilibrium within the framework of the GMG through an
iterative procedure that can be regarded as an annealing protocol. The key point is to
realize that quenching is produced by the memory stored in the points gained by the agents.
In fact the quenched state remains unchanged because on the average agents continue to
gain points. To correct the quenched phase, a procedure can be implemented that consists
in obliterating periodically the memory of the system. This is donne removing all the points
gained by all the agents in each iteration. In each annealing episode the system is allowed to
evolve freely during a maximum of ns steps; at the end, several parameters are calculated:
the fraction ϕ5 of agents that have gained not less that 5 points, the relative attendance M,
the fraction of histories fh where the system does not reach a quenched configuration in the
allowed ns steps, and the fraction fq = nq/ns, where nq is the actual number of evolution
steps that are needed to quench the system.
The results obtained are shown in Fig.10 for two values of G and µ = 850/1001. At the
end of the first episode the distribution Pq (Fig.10a)) that is found is entirely similar to the
humped distribution shown in Fig2, and ϕ5 = 1, thus corresponding to a quenched phase.
As agents are repeatedly deprived of points some of them are increasingly forced to update
their strategies. For G = 1 (Fig.10b)) and during the first 30 annealing episodes very few
steps are required in order to have ϕ5 = 1; after ∼ 35 annealing episodes a clear transition
takes place that can be interpreted as a gradual melting of the system: the fraction ϕ5 drops
while fh and fq grow abruptly, almost reaching their maximum possible values. For G = 1.1
(Fig.10c)) this transition is not present as can be seen from the fact that ϕ5 is constantly
equal to one, while fh = 0. It is most remarkable, however, that the relative attendance M
still reaches the value µ, as for G = 1. In other words, the annealing protocol is seen to
be able to drive the system towards M ≃ µ with or without a change of the phase of the
system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In the present work we have discussed the self organization properties of two multi agent
models, the BAM and the GMG. We have shown the relevance of two control parameters.
One is the fraction of the population of agents µ that has to be joined in order to make the
correct decision. The other is G that represents the gain produced by a correct decision,
measured in units of the fine payed for making the wrong one. For the sake of concreteness
we have borrowed the framework of the BAM in which the decision that has to be made is
to go or not to a bar. The decision is the correct one if the fraction of the population that
has decided to go does not exceed µ.
The system under consideration lacks any interaction or internal correlation among the
agents. Each agent feels the presence of the rest only through the value of an aggregate
parameter that is the total attendance and rewards or penalties of individual actions are
decided with respect to its particular value in each moment. Otherwise, agents act indepen-
dently from each other. With these rules, the many agent system adapts and always reaches
12
stable asymptotic configurations. These are, however, of quite different nature depending
upon the values of the control parameters, of the initial conditions and on the information
that is used to guide the individual actions.
The usual framework of the minority game, if generalized to take into account arbitrary
values of µ, gives rise either to states of equilibrium or to quenched configurations. The
former have a density distribution of individual strategies that only depends upon the value
of G and µ and remains stationary while a fraction of the population Cs continuously
updates their strategies. Quenched states have instead frequency distributions that may be
very different depending upon the initial conditions, while Cs drops exponentially to zero in
all cases.
A phase diagram for the GMG can be established in the µ − G plane. Quenching
occurs outside a region limited by a critical line µcr(G). This border line has been obtained
numerically for uniform initial conditions. If a δ− type distribution is assumed analytic
expressions can be obtained. In both cases finite size effects are found. A rigorous estimate
can be made for an infinite system in this later case. It is found that if N → ∞ the point
(G = 1, µ = 1/2) belongs to the critical line. A numerical estimate of finite size effects for
a uniform initial distribution is also in agreement with this result. It is interesting to note
that these are the usual settings for the minority game widely used in the literature.
The shape of the distribution P (p) is the combined result of the actions of many ‘in-
dependent’ agents. In spite of such independence we have proven that the equilibrium
distribution optimizes the statistical occurrence of the most convenient coordinated state
or, equivalently, minimizes the average aggregate cost of the ensemble of agents.
A quenched state is reached when the individual updating of strategies stops. This should
however not be considered to correspond to a “frozen” configuration. If this where the case,
an internal ordered state would be found bearing no relationship with the initial conditions.
Contrary to this, the quenched state is far from being unique, the “glassy” structure of
the quenched phase lacks any preferred internal ordering. This should be regarded as the
signature of the absence of interactions among the agents and has to be attributed purely to
dynamic effects. While equilibrium is associated to the optimization of the global magnitude,
this is no longer true for a quenched configuration.
Reaching a quenched phase is a direct consequence of the evolution dynamics contained
in the rules for updating the individual strategies. This effect is evident when the GMG is
compared to the dynamics arising from the BAM with mixed strategies, as we have presented
here. Contrary to the GMG, when starting from a uniform distribution the BAM always
reaches a state of equilibrium, independently of the values of µ and G. The two models
differ in the use of the available information. While the GMG dynamics only keeps record
of good and wrong decisions, the seemingly minor modifications implied in the BAM rules,
allows to keep also track of the reasons for such successes and failures. The system thus
keeps a better “memory” of the previous steps in the dynamics. The consequence of this is
that the system always self organizes in such a way that M → µ.
The many agent system that has been presented here has several features that are rem-
iniscent of the physics of many body systems. In the first place one should note that a
quenched phase can be induced for critical values of µ and G. A sort of order parameter
can be established with the relative attendance M(t). Two regions can be individualized in
parameter space, one in which M(t) → µ and the other in which M(t) → M∞ 6= µ. For
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critical values of µ and G, the system undergoes an internal transformation reflected by a
peak in the dispersion σA that reminds the behavior of the susceptibility at a second order
phase transition.
Although the model does not contain any two body interaction, within this analogy “par-
ticles” accomodate themselves following an ocupational constraint (the maximum allowed
attendance) very much in the same fashion as in many fermion system. To support this view-
point, one could note that very few “particles” participate in the dynamics. The parameter
µ fixes the total attendance and therefore plays the role of the chemical potential through
an effective collective interaction. From this point of view individual gains should be related
to (the negative of) a kind of single particle energy: those agents that have accumulated
large gains are less likely to participate in the dynamics.
A resemblance can also be established between quenching in GMG and similar situations
found in many body systems. In fact we have described a gradual modification of the
quenched configuration through a procedure that is entirely similar to an annealing protocol.
It turns out that a quenched state can gradually be “melted” into a state of equilibrium if
all the points that have been gained by the agents are periodically eliminated. The points
accumulated by the agents keep memory of the previous results and each remotion can be
thought as an exchange of ‘energy’ with a thermal bath in order to reach equilibrium.
The concept of temperature has been introduced in the MG in several contexts. In
all cases it is assimilated to random fluctuations. In this work we have not attempted
to introduce the temperature. It is worthwhile to mention, however, that in fact there is
an individual source of fluctuations present, associated with the update of pi described in
Section II. We recall that every time a new value of pi has to be chosen, it is randomly
selected from an interval of width δp around it. Hence, this fluctuation acts as a source of
fixed temperature, T0 say, and can be recognized as the final reason that explains why the
distribution function P (p) does not simply converges to the sum of several δ’s. Hence, our
work can be considered to describe the relaxation to equilibrium at that fixed temperature
T = 0, except when the annealing protocol is applied. This framework could be extended
to a situation at T 6= 0 by introducing fluctuations allowing for instance individual agents
to change probabilistically their assistance strategies.
The BAM has been worked out to show how internal coordination of markets or economic
systems can derive from uncoordinated individual actions that are inspired by a common
belief. It is a clear example in which an ensemble of agents with limited information about
somebody else’s decisions can nevertheless give rise to a self organized pattern within a
scheme referred to as “bounded rationality”. The relaxation process reminds what in eco-
nomics is known as “tatonnement”. Opposed to this, the “rational expectations” solution
to the BAM or the GMG would be a distribution P (p) = δ(p− µ) because it describes the
only common action that is consistent with the general knowledge of all agents about ev-
erybody else’s decisions concerning the acceptable attendance. It is interesting to note that
this solution is in general far from equilibrium and hence is neither stationary nor optimal.
The Minority Game, regarded as a simplified version of the BAM has also been repeat-
edly presented as a schematic framework with similar interest for economics. However the
occurrence of quenched asymptotic configurations in a straightforward generalization of the
MG puts some limitations to the aplicability of the model to stylized economic situations.
Quenched configurations are trivial examples of equilibria because the adaptation dynamic
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has stopped, but they are neither Nash equilibria nor Pareto optimal. In fact, if M 6= µ
many individual situations can be improved without harming the situation of any other
agent. It is intersting to note that such configurations are produced by the limited use that
agents make of the available information. GMG can therefore safely be used if quenching is
avoided or special situations are considered in which this is not particularly relevant. Oth-
erwise, one should bear in mind that to simulate market environments it is mandatory to
assume that the agents must make full use of all the available information.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. GMG and BAM without quenching. In this case, N = 1001, G = 1 and µ = 600/1001.
The data is averaged over 200 histories. In (a) we show P∞(p) for both cases; (b) illustrates the
time evolution of the reduced attendance M(t) and Cs(t), the fraction of moving agents. Notice
that Cs(t) does not vanish
FIG. 2. BAM and GMG with quenching, for the same values of N and G than in the previous
figure, but µ = 800/1001. In (a) we show that the shape of P (p) has little changes for the BAM,
while the GMG distribution is strongly modified. Correspondingly, in (b) one can see that GMG
does not reach the allowed assistance (M 6= µ) because the system stops evolving (Cs = 0) very
rapidly. Data for GMG is averaged over 3000 histories. In the broken x-axis we show that BAM
does not quench even after 106 time steps
FIG. 3. (a) Reduced attendance as a function of µ, for N = 101. It can be seen that µcr is a
function of G. Size effects are shown in the inset. (b) transition from a non-quenched (ϕ20 6= 1) to
a quenched state (ϕ20 = 1)
FIG. 4. Phase diagram for the GMG in the µ − G plane. (△) shows an analytic solution for
a δ-type initial condition, while (✷ and (✸) correspond to numerical solutions starting from a
uniform distribution. The critical border for the BAM with δ-type initial conditions would be a
vertical line at G ≃ 1, 22 for N = 100
FIG. 5. Change of P (p) with G, for µ = 0.6
FIG. 6. The roots pp and pc of Eqs.(9) and (10) are exemplified for N = 20 and n = 14. These
values are chosen for the sake of clarity of the figures. Notice that as G increases pc becomes
smaller and pp becomes larger
FIG. 7. Quenching for the BAM for δ-type initial conditions is possible for G > Gcr. The roots
pp and pc are ploted as a function of G and the indicated values of µ. Both roots are equal for
G = Gcr. The value of Gcr is largely independent of µ.
FIG. 8. Distributions P (p) for the GMG (right axis), obtained from three initial conditions
δ(p − p0). We also show Pw, (left axis) to help to understand the evolution of the systems. The
roots p< and p> correspond to the two roots Pw = 1/2. In this case, µ = 75/101
FIG. 9. (a) Gcrit vs 1/N up to N = 1000. Eq.14 provides an excellent fit that can not be
distinguished from numerical data for GMG, G = 1, µ = 0.5 ; (b) pcr as a function of 1/N for the
same values of µ.
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FIG. 10. Annealing in the GMG
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